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PDF) Regulatory Influence on Market Conditions in the Banking Union: the Cases of Macro-Prudential Instruments and the Bail-in Tool
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ayko2718 on X: "This sounds like a bail in by depositors rather than a series C. IF existing equity holders are not being fully wiped out or massively diluted then the creditors
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The Bail-in Beyond Unpredictability: Creditors' Incentives and Market Discipline | European Business Organization Law Review
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